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The Battle of
Blair Mountain:
A New Narrative
on the Forgotten
Civil Uprising
of TwentiethCentury America
AIDEN DUFFEY
Worcester State University

O

n August 25th, 1921, at Blair Mountain in
Logan County, West Virginia, a battle was
fought between union workers of the United
Mine Workers of America and a collection of local
police, mercenaries, and federal troops, an event that
was part of the larger conflict: the West Virginia Mine
Wars1. While only taking place over the course of a
week, the Battle of Blair Mountain, as it came to be
known, was the largest labor uprising in American
history, as well as the largest armed uprising to this day
since the Civil War. Despite its scale and significance,
the Battle of Blair Mountain has faded into relative

obscurity over the years, placing its history at a risk of
being forgotten entirely. This fact directly inspired the
writing of this piece as its goal is to call new audiences’
attention to the battle’s history and ideally, inspire
further study of the subject. As we fast approach the
hundredth anniversary of the battle, now seems like as
great a time as any to revisit its history, by constructing
a new narrative based on a critical analysis of the
primary and scholarly accounts of the battle that exist,
in an effort to examine not only the battle’s immediate
impact on the coal industry, and public perception of
the American labor movement as a whole, but also
to explore how the challenges presented by the battle
mirror current events in our society.
While the West Virginia Mine Wars is a topic
that is at least familiar within American labor history
circles, the Battle of Blair Mountain is an event
severely lacking in scholarship, especially considering
its fame and impact at the time it occurred. West
Virginia maintains extensive records and accounts of
the battle both in the state archives and at the West
Virginia Mine Wars Museum, but unfortunately, most
of their resources have not yet been digitized, although
those that have, provided a wealth of information in
the form of first-hand accounts or newspaper articles
written immediately following the battle. The museum
was beginning the process of moving to a new building
when the Covid-19 pandemic occurred, which has
provided challenges in accessing their archives.
Fortunately, the museum has quite recently reopened
their doors to the public, meaning their resources are
more readily available. A visit to the museum in the

Robert Shogan. The Battle of Blair Mountain: The Story of America’s Largest Labor Uprising. (New York City: Basic Books, 2006),
168. Miners began assembling and marching on Blair on August 24th, but the first exchanges of fire did not occur until August 25th
between Sheriff Chafin’s men and UMWA miners.
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near future will hopefully yield follow-up research
to this piece in the form of an additional article. The
one academic source that has been most beneficial to
this study from a historiographic standpoint is Robert
Shogan’s (2006) book, The Battle of Blair Mountain:
The Story of America’s Largest Labor Uprising. Unlike
most books on the West Virginia Mine Wars, which
briefly touch upon Blair Mountain, Shogan’s work,
as the title would suggest, is exclusively dedicated
to the Battle of Blair Mountain, making it by far the
most valuable scholarly account for the purposes of
this research2. While Shogan’s work, similarly to the
primary-source accounts utilized in this project, does
express bias, in his case in favor of the United Mine
Workers of America, he approaches the issue in a
unique manner. During an interview in 2004 for Focus,
an Illinois University radio talk show, when asked why
the Battle of Blair Mountain was significant to labor
history, Shogan clarified that he viewed the battle as
an important part of American history, as a whole, that
has ramifications beyond the confines of labor itself3.
This perspective, in addition to his excellent research,
is what makes Shogan’s work so creditable, as while
he does show a greater degree of sympathy to one side

in the conflict, he approaches the subject of the battle
with a nationwide view that relieves him of the burden
of being bogged down by local politics and economic
interests. While this present article is nowhere near as
in depth a study of the battle as Shogan’s, his work
is more focused on the experience of the miners
themselves, whereas this article seeks to examine all
parties involved as well as analyze the impact the battle
has left over the past hundred years.
To better understand why the Battle of Blair
Mountain was fought, and how it escalated to such a
large conflict, some context is needed both on a national
and a local level. Leading up to 1921, when the Battle
of Blair Mountain was fought, unions were in a position
of great turmoil. During World War I, which ended
only a few short years before, unions, especially those
related to mining and in particular coal production,
gained a great deal of power and national influence.
This may have in part been due to national sympathy
towards industrial work as a whole that was heavily
featured in wartime propaganda but was primarily due
to the national high demand for coal at a time when
labor was in extremely short supply4. As coal mining
companies did not have the luxury of large amounts of

Thomas, G. Andrews, Killing for Coal. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), Chap. 5, Out of the Depths and on to the March
touches upon the Battle of Blair Mountain, although the book is primarily focused on the Ludlow Massacre of 1914, an earlier conflict
in the greater labor struggle surrounding the coal industry. Corbin, David. Life, Work, and Rebellion in the Coal Fields: The Southern
West Virginia Miners, 1880-1922. (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1989),182, 218, 219, 221. Corbin’s book covers the West
Virginia Coal Wars as a whole, and, as such, does not focus on the Battle of Blair Mountain. Lane, Winthrop D. Civil War in West
Virginia. (B. W. Huebsch, inc.) New York, 1921, 105-109. Lane discusses escalation to the Battle of Blair Mountain and addresses
previous conflicts in Logan County specifically, but as Civil War in West Virginia was released in 1921, the same year as the battle, it
is unlikely Lane would have had the time or resources to include the Battle of Blair Mountain into their work in any further capacity.
3
Focus; “The Battle of Blair Mountain: The Story of America’s Largest Labor Uprising,” 2004-07-07, WILL Illinois Public Media,
American Archive of Public Broadcasting.
4
Robert Shogan. The Battle of Blair Mountain: The Story of America’s Largest Labor Uprising. (New York City: Basic Books, 2006),
140. While the coal industry hit a boom during the war, the highest average income of skilled miners in West Virginia was only $1,060
annually. These, even for the period, extremely low wages were a motivating factor for union resistance to the coal industry, but also
an indication of the lack of success the UMWA had in West Virginia when compared to other states.
2
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easily hirable labor during the war, coal miners were
able to negotiate better wages and more rights that led
to expansive growth in union power.
As industrial unions rose in power, one in
particular gained national influence, the United Mine
Workers of America (UMWA)5. While the UMWA
had mining operations across several states, they
made minimal inroads into West Virginia as coal
corporations in the state managed to maintain control
of their operations during World War I6. After the war,
as the number of people in the job market increased
once more along with a reduction in the demand for
coal, union expansion was somewhat diminished7. The
UMWA was still by far one of the strongest unions
in the country, but their growth, especially in West
Virginia, stagnated as the nation’s reliance on unions
lessened. This left West Virginia a divided state, where
counties were either strongly sympathetic to union
operations or strongly opposed. This divide between
union workers and sympathizers against the holdout

corporate mining operations and their allies laid the
foundation for the West Virginia Mine Wars.
While other clashes over mine labor preceded
the Battle of Blair Mountain,8 the most important event
happened in the neighboring county, Mingo, in the
coal mining town of Matewan9. On May 19th, 1920,
a group of men from the Baldwin-Felts Detective
Agency, operating on behalf of West Virginian coal
operators, arrived in Matewan10 to serve eviction
notices to residents living at Stone Mountain’s coal
camp.11 The detectives’ second objective, and reason

the evictions they were dispensing. This disagreement
led to a shootout, in which the identity of the aggressor
is up for debate, between the Baldwin-Felts detectives
and Matewan locals including Hatfield, coal miners,
and members of the UMWA. The conflict left seven
detectives and three locals dead, including Albert and
Lee Felts and Mayor Cabell Testerman.
The Matewan shootout could have easily been
a stand-alone conflict in the history of the West Virginia
Mine Wars, but due to the direct results of the conflict,
it sparked even larger events.13 Several members of the

for coming to Matewan, was to break up efforts at
unionizing the coal fields. The detectives were fully
prepared to carry out both these tasks as they served
the benefits of their contractors, non-union coal
companies operating in the southern West Virginia
coal fields. Matewan’s Chief of Police, Sid Hatfield,
along with Matewan’s Mayor, Cabell Testerman, both
union sympathizers and supporters of the UMWA,12
confronted the detectives and opposed the legality of

UMWA local leadership were arrested and held in jail
in Mingo County with charges relating to the shootout.
Sid Hadfield also had charges brought up against him,
which some sources claim were unfounded and had
only been drawn up as an excuse to get Hatfield out in
the open. While Hatfield’s participation in the Matewan
shootout is undeniable, and charges against him could
reasonably be considered at the very least, suspicions
as to the dubious nature of the charges against Hatfield
could be seen as valid considering the following
events. Upon arriving for his court hearing, Hatfield
was murdered on the courthouse steps by members of
the Baldwin-Felts Detective Agency. A coverup to give
the appearance of a shootout between Hatfield and the
detectives was staged but was unsuccessful in fooling
the UMWA, who were outraged at these actions.
With two of their allies, Testerman and Hatfield,
both dead along with their leadership imprisoned, not
to mention years of previous tension and hostility with
coal operators, the UMWA began planning retaliatory

Ibid, 2. The Union Mine Workers of America were the most powerful union in the nation coming into the 1920s.
Ibid, 271. Post WWI, the coal industry, as a whole, experienced decline, but non-union operators were able to capitalize on this
transition with more success than the UMWA.
7
Bituminous Operators' Special Committee to the United States Coal Commission, “The United Mine Workers in West Virginia.” [S.l.
: s.n., 1923], 3. The UMWA failed to attain exclusive rights to mining operations in West Virginia in 1919, which was a major loss for
the union and an escalation factor in hostilities between union and non-union coal operators in the state.
8
William C. Blizzard When Miners March. (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2010), 358. In addition to the Matewan shootout, the incident at
Lick Creek was a contributing motivation to the Battle of Blair Mountain, especially due to the fact that it prompted the implementation
of martial law in the environment of its occurrence.
9
Robert Shogan. The Battle of Blair Mountain: The Story of America’s Largest Labor Uprising. (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2006), 3.
Matewan, being in the direct center of the richest coal fields in West Virginia, became a focal point for the greater West Virginia Coal
Wars due to massive commercial value.
10 
Ibid, 1. The Baldwin-Felts Detectives, seven in total, were all armed and “had all been tried and relied on” according to Tom Felts,
brother to Albert Felts. Blizzard contests the number of detectives present, citing their numbers as “more than a dozen.” (Blizzard 131).
11 
William C. Blizzard When Miners March. (Oakland: PM Press, 2010), 125. Six families in total were evicted under the authority of
Circuit Judge James Damron, who acted as an attorney for the coal operators in later case against the UMWA.
12 
Ibid, 130. While Mingo County as a whole was primarily controlled by non-union coal operators, Matewan, itself, was known to be
very sympathetic to the union cause, making it a focal point of the Baldwin-Felts Detective Agency’s union-busting campaign on
behalf of the coal operators.
5
6
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action. Within a year of the Matewan shootout’s
explosive conclusion, and mere months since the
imprisonment of UMWA leaders and the murder of
Hatfield, UMWA miners were called upon by their
leadership to arm themselves, mobilize across the
southern West Virginia coal fields, and began to march
on Mingo County. Their goal was to free their fellow
UMWA members who were imprisoned there and take
revenge on those who fought against their efforts to
unionize the southern West Virginia coal fields. Beyond
the coal industry, itself, the UMWA sought revenge on
local West Virginia government officials, especially
law enforcement and judges who were either in the
pocket of coal operators or assumed to be. These were
the types of people UMWA believed to have been
responsible in orchestrating Hatfield’s murder as well
as being the men in charge of detaining their fellow
union members. To reach Mingo, the UMWA workers
needed to cross through neighboring Logan County.
Knowing this and selecting the most strategic point
of defense, Logan County police, local residents, and
mercenary vigilante forces, some in the employ of the
coal corporations, bunkered down in the town of Blair
at the base of Blair Mountain and armed themselves.
The UMWA marchers, who were also armed, upon
arriving in Blair, quickly realized they would need to
fight their way over the mountain to reach Mingo, and
thus, the stage for the Battle of Blair Mountain was set.
Accounts of the Battle of Blair Mountain
provide drastically different narratives of the events
due to a combination of bias and perspective skewing

Robert Shogan. The Battle of Blair Mountain: The Story of America’s Largest Labor Uprising. (New York City: Basic Books, 2006),
121. May 19th, 1921. Morgan County declared martial law a year to the day after the Matewan shootout, which further escalated
tensions between coal operators and miners only a few short months before the Battle of Blair Mountain broke out.
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the facts. While no account is without its issues,
the three majority perspectives to be taken into
consideration are the UMWA, coal operators, and
Blair locals. A fourth, extremely important perspective
is that of the United States military as they were the
largest deciding factor of the outcome of the battle,
but unfortunately, documentation of the battle from
a military perspective is not as readily available and
as such cannot be discussed for the purposes of this
research, although it will be referenced in context of
other sources. Before detailing the events of the battle,
itself, it is worth mentioning context behind each of the
three factions’ sources.
The UMWA’s account of the Battle of Blair
Mountain is best detailed in William Blizzard’s book,
When Miners March, which contains his narrative of
the battle and its aftermath. What makes Blizzard’s
account so valuable is the role he played during the
battle as he was both one of the leaders of the march
itself, as well as the UMWA’s military commander
during the battle, and, after the fact, stepped forward
to take primary responsibility for the UMWA’s actions
during the subsequent trials. Unsurprisingly, Blizzard’s
book is heavily biased in favor of the UMWA, but his
account is no less valuable for it contextualizes why
the union decided upon armed resistance in the first
place.
Contrasting Blizzard’s account is the Bituminous
Operators' Special Committee to the United States
Coal Commission, “The United Mine Workers in West
Virginia,” which was a report written two years after
the battle that both details some of its events as well
as makes a case for more aggressive legal action to be
carried out against unions, in particular, the UMWA,

120 • The Graduate Review • 2021

for their part in the armed uprising. Unlike Blizzard’s
book, which reads as a more chronological history
of the UMWA in West Virginia, the coal commission
report touches on a wide range of labor conflict across
the country, and while it focuses primarily on the
UMWA and was penned in response to the Battle of
Blair Mountain, it is not strictly an account of the battle
itself. A clear goal of the report is to paint the actions
of the UMWA as dangerous and in direct opposition
to American laws and values. The most obvious,
and all together inaccurate means of conveying this
message, is the claims in the report that the UMWA
were communist. No direct evidence to support this
claim was presented outside of the fact that the UMWA
sought better wages and working conditions for miners,
and some of their membership expressed radical views,
although those same beliefs were not necessarily held
union wide. Framing the UMWA as a communist union
was done with the intention of painting the union as
anti-government, a commonly held stereotype about
communism at the time. In this regard, the claim could
not be more inaccurate as the UMWA was a fiercely
patriotic union with a large veteran membership and
a history of complying with and supporting federal
legislation and action. Communism absolutely had a
significant role to play within the greater picture of
the American labor movement, but this stereotypical
assertion that all communists were anti-government
absolutely does not hold true, especially in context of
the UMWA specifically, and to categorize the union
under the umbrella of communism, in this context, is
inaccurate and intentionally manipulative. The claims
of communism brought up in the coal commission
report were intended both as rationalization for the
Bridgewater State University

coal industry’s actions during the Battle of Blair
Mountain and as a means of discrediting the UMWA’s
calls for fairer wages for miners. The strategy here
was to paint the UMWA as an anti-government
organization by leaning into the stereotype at the time
that all communists actively sought the destruction of
government. This inaccurate assertion about the nature
of communism and its relationship with government
was far from accurate, but an easily exploitable avenue
of justification at the time. While, once again, the report
is heavily biased in favor of coal mining operations and
denounces the UMWA, it has the additional advantage
of contextualizing the Battle of Blair Mountain in
relation to nationwide labor struggles.
The last, and possibly most important
perspective is that of Blair locals. The residents of Blair,
based on first-hand accounts, were somewhat divided
in their loyalties when it came to the actual battle itself,
but for the most part, they either actively or passively
were against any disruption to the coal industry, which
could produce serious consequences to the local
economy. Blair residents’ loyalty to the coal operators
was therefore either grudgingly performed out of selfpreservation, or, in the case of local law enforcement,
tied directly to monetary benefit. The organization of
Blair’s defenses against the UMWA was spearheaded
by Sheriff Don Chafin, a divisive figure feared by
everyone involved in the conflict, and most of the Blair
residents’ first- hand accounts center their narratives
around his actions more than anyone else’s14. This

research does not focus on a single narrative from Blair
residents, but rather a compiled account put together
by the Logan County West Virginia Genealogical
Society and the Matewan Oral History Project15 in
the form of a series of interviews with residents who
lived through the battle. Therefore, accounts from
Blair residents are woven from multiple narratives as
opposed to a singularly compiled source like Blizzard’s
book or the coal commission report. Incorporating a
local perspective on the battle is extremely important
because it may be the least biased account out of any
that appears, but the greatest shortcoming is their lack
of comprehensiveness, necessitating a more cobbled
together approach at constructing their narrative as
opposed to the very clear and straightforward accounts
by Blizzard and the coal commission report.
The events that collectively can be referred to
as the Battle of Blair Mountain truly began on August
25, 1921, when the first exchanges of gunfire occurred
between UMWA miners and Chafin’s deputies. While
the UMWA was still mobilizing towards Blair, most
of their numbers, estimated anywhere between ten and
fifteen thousand strong, were not yet present, giving
Chafin’s forces, roughly two thousand troops, a rare
instance of superior numbers. Whereas the UMWA
vastly outnumbered the Blair deputies throughout
the majority of the conflict, Chafin was backed by
the Logan County Coal Operators Association,
representing anti-union mining operations in the area,
who essentially provided Chafin with a heavily armed,

Rebecca Bailey. Interview with Gladys Hood. Matewan Oral History Project. (Matewan Development Center, Matewan, 1990.)
Gladys’ recollection of Sheriff Chafin stressed his anti-union sentiments and the fear he inspired throughout Logan County.
15 
Rebecca Bailey. Interview with Gladys Hood. Matewan Oral History Project. (Matewan Development Center, Matewan, 1990.)
Gladys Hood, resident of Matewan, lived through the West Virginia Mine Wars.
14 
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private army. By comparison, the UMWA, while
armed as well, were poorly equipped and nowhere near
as collectively organized as Chafin’s better prepared
forces were. These critical factors heavily played into
the outcomes of the majority of skirmishes that made
up the collective battle.
The initial conflict on August 25th was
a decisive victory on Chafin’s part as the small
UMWA forces were repelled from Blair. Following
this exchange, President Warren Harding’s threat of
deploying federal troops and even bombing union
forces prompted the UMWA to disband their efforts
and begin to return home16. Harding’s threat, driven
primarily by his anti-union sentiments tied to his view
that unionization was synonymous with communism,
may have, at the time, been toothless as military
intervention would have been viewed by the American
public as too extreme of a response. Regardless of the
seriousness of the president’s threat, it was successful
in diffusing the situation and may have been the end of
the conflict. However, rumor of Chafin shooting union
sympathizers near Blair following the president’s
threat reinvigorated the UMWA’s anger towards the
sheriff. Word was spread quickly, and UMWA miners
returning home from Blair made an about face and
rushed back to the mountain to regroup. By Blizzard’s
account, this was Chafin’s attempt to provoke the
UMWA and instigate a full-scale battle with federal
backing on his side.
Ironically, the idea of utilizing federal support

was shared by the UMWA, as many in their leadership
hoped a demonstration of force would indicate
the severity of their fight against non-union coal
operations and bring the issue to a national level. This
was a driving force behind why the UMWA decided
to stand down when President Harding threatened
to intervene with the army, as taking on the federal
government went against the miners’ interests. While
non-union coal operators and their allies, especially
in the coal commission report, painted the UMWA as
communists, the UMWA was in no way opposing the
federal government and always remained democratic
in nature. A second reason why army involvement
deterred the UMWA from continuing their attack was
the fact that many of the miners were veterans of WWI
and had no interest in fighting against a military they
had previously served. Shogan notes in an interview
that the UMWA sentiment towards clashing with the
army could be summed up in one simple phrase, “we
won’t go to war with Uncle Sam”17.
Despite the previous threat of federal
involvement, the UMWA did return to Blair, and on
August 29th, the battle resumed in earnest. Chafin’s
forces maintained defensive positions, taking advantage
of the high ground the mountain provided, and were
able to stop the miners’ advance a second time. Once
again, this was accomplished by means of heavier
firepower at Chafin’s disposal. Employing the use of
private planes, Chafin’s troops hit the UMWA forces
with a series of airstrikes, using military-grade gas and

explosive bombs presumed to be surplus from WWI18.
The army, under orders from General Billy Mitchell,
often considered the father of the American Air Force,
deployed Martin bombers as well as contributing
further to Chafin’s air support, but these planes were
utilized strictly for surveillance, as it would still be
several days before the federal government would take
an active role in the battle’s resolution19.
This bombing campaign is a matter of great
confusion, both for those involved in the battle and their
subsequent accounts. Some assumed the bombs were
dropped by the U.S. Army, having seen U.S. Army
planes making flyovers during the battle. Mentions of
army munitions being used in the bombing suggest
U.S. military backing without direct involvement
in the attack. The reality, as best understood by a
consideration of all available sources, is that the bombs
were homemade explosives created by Chafin’s forces
and deployed by local pilots operating private planes.
The U.S. Army’s Martin bombers, while armed, did not
take any part in the bombing campaign and were present
for reconnaissance purposes only, as Federal troops
were not instructed to take aggressive action against the
UMWA forces until days later on September 2nd20.

Despite Chafin’s vastly superior arms, the
UMWA continued fighting, and on August 30th, West
Virginia National Guard Colonel William Eubanks was
brought in to take charge of combined law enforcement
and vigilante forces fighting the UMWA21. The swell
in numbers to the anti-union forces did not deter the
UMWA, however, and the miners continued their attack,
almost managing to reach Logan during one assault,
only a short distance from their goal of Mingo County.
Skirmishes continued until September 2nd,
when federal troops were officially deployed to
combat the UMWA, which prompted Bill Blizzard to
call a withdrawal of his forces. The miners disbanded
and began returning home, many of them stowing their
weapons away in the secret caches in the woods in an
attempt to avoid detection. Casualty counts differ from
source to source, but anywhere between ten and thirty
members of Chafin’s forces were killed along with
another fifty to a hundred UMWA miners. Charges of
murder, conspiracy to commit murder, accessory to
murder, and treason against the state of West Virginia
were brought up against a total of nine hundred and
eighty-five miners including Blizzard himself, who,
once again, assumed a leadership role for the UMWA22.

Robert Shogan. The Battle of Blair Mountain: The Story of America’s Largest Labor Uprising. (New York City: Basic Books, 2006),
271. President Harding: “It looks to me as though we are coming to a crisis in the conflict between the radical labor leaders and the
capitalistic system under which we developed our Republic.”
17 
Focus, Shogan describing the UMWA’s refusal to fight against federal forces deployed to Blair Mountain at the end of the engagement.

William C. Blizzard When Miners March. (Oakland: PM Press, 2010), 303. W.F. Denim and Earl Halloran, two of the three pilots hired
by the coal operators, maintain they used their planes for “observation” only, while R.S. Haynes, the third pilot, admits to the pilots
using explosive and gas bombs on the miners.
19 
Ibid, 311. Blizzard attests that Mitchell was present in the hopes of finding an excuse to test out the effectiveness of new planes in a
military setting.
20 
William C. Blizzard When Miners March. (Oakland: PM Press, 2010), 313. One of the pilots operating in this mission stated that before
returning to base, the crew jettisoned their bombs in the James River, presumably in an effort to disguise the fact they had been armed
in the first place. The only active participants in the bombing campaign were the planes under Chafin’s command, although this would
not be made clear to many on the ground during the battle until after its conclusion.
21 
William C. Blizzard When Miners March. (Oakland: PM Press, 2010), 303. Eubanks estimated that over the course of the battle, his
forces fired anywhere between 500,000 and 600,000 rounds of ammunition, and that the miners “wasted as much as we did.”
22 
Ibid, 342. Having been positioned as the leader of the UMWA forces during the Battle of Blair Mountain, Blizzard had to be the center
point of the coal operators’ prosecution of the union. However, unless Blizzard was found responsible for the actions of all the miners
at the battle, the case against him personally was not strong, which led to his eventual equital.
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Some UMWA members were imprisoned for
years, but the last to be paroled were released in 192523.
During Blizzard’s trial, unexploded bombs dropped
by Chafin’s forces that were recovered by the miners
and were used as evidence in defense of the UMWA24,
painting Chafin, and, by extension, the coal industry
as brutally violent and tyrannical25. In April of 1922,
at Jefferson County Circuit Courthouse, after having
been held at the same jail26 where John Brown had
been tried for his role in the battle at Harper’s Ferry
years before27, all charges against Bill Blizzard were

Bituminous Operators’ Special Committee to the United States Coal Commission, “The United Mine Workers in West Virginia.” [S.l. :
s.n., 1923], 67. Lists the acquittals of several prominent members of the UMWA including Blizzard, J. E. Willburn, and Walter Allen.
24 
William C. Blizzard When Miners March. (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2010), 341. The state’s forces openly admitted to dropping bombs
on the miners when the recovered homemade explosive was displayed as evidence in Blizzard’s trial.
25 
State of West Virginia v. William Blizzard, Indictment No. 4, Special Plea No. 2
26 
Bituminous Operators’ Special Committee to the United States Coal Commission, “The United Mine Workers in West Virginia.” [S.l.
: s.n., 1923], 66. Charles Town, WV.
27 
Karen Whitman. “Re-evaluating John Brown’s Raid at Harpers Ferry” West Virginia Archives and History Vol 34, number 1. Charleston:
1972, 46. On October 16th, 1859, John Brown, led an attack on the Federal Arsenal at Harpers Ferry, West Virginia with the intention
of supplying slaves with weapons and staging a revolt against slave owners in West Virginia. John Brown has been lauded and vilified
for his actions throughout history as he is depicted as either a champion of liberty, an enemy of the state, or a roadblock for the
Abolitionist movement and peaceful negotiations between the North and South over the issue of slavery.
28 
State of West Virginia v. William Blizzard, Indictment No. 4, Special Plea No. 2
29 
“’Disgrace to State,’ Some Yell, But Great Mass Cheer Verdict. Never Had Intention to Commit Treason, Blizzard Says.” Charleston
Gazette, May 28th, 1922. The event Osenton is referring to was part of the initial skirmish that snowballed into the Battle of Blair
Mountain in which John Gore, a Logan County sheriff’s deputy, along with John Cofago and Jim Munsey, two local miners who sided
with Chafin’s forces, were discovered by UMWA forces, after having fired upon the UMWA camp at night. Upon being discovered,
Gore called for a standoff and Reverend John Wilburn, a Blair Baptist preacher and leader of the UMWA forces, advanced forward
to meet with Gore. A shootout erupted, believed to be initiated by either Cofago or Munsey, which left Gore and Cofago dead along
with Eli Kemp, one of the UMWA miners. Munsey, badly wounded and pleading for mercy, was shot through the head where he lay
by Henry Kitchin, a UMWA miner. One of the miners described Munsey’s body as looking “like water out of a hose where you turn
it on and the pressure is light.”

the aforementioned men, but as Blizzard had assumed
responsibility for the actions of the UMWA during the
events of the Battle of Blair Mountain, he would have
to bear the responsibility, due to the fact that Gore,
Cofago and Munsey were killed by UMWA forces.
Since Blizzard was not involved directly or indirectly
with the event itself, he could not be found guilty of
their murder. Much of Blizzard’s trial proceeded in
a similar fashion, where the state was unable to link
Blizzard directly with the most serious crimes they
attached to the UMWA’s actions.
Blizzard’s release and the resilience of union
sympathy in West Virginia would perhaps be the most
resounding success for the UMWA with regard to the
outcome of the Battle of Blair Mountain, for while they
lost the conflict itself, their goal of presenting the coal
industry on a national stage as cruel and unjust was
largely successful. Despite this fact, the Battle of Blair
Mountain was the nail in the coffin for the UMWA as
a whole. The fight to unionize the West Virginia coal
fields was a resounding loss, which was later followed
by Pennsylvania’s and Kentucky’s unions hold on coal
mining operations collapsing and leaving Illinois as
the only unionized state remaining.
The Battle of Blair Mountain and the West
Virginia Mine Wars as a whole left a stain on the
reputation of unions, whether affiliated with the conflict
or not, as violent communists seeking to overthrow
the government. This fallacy was propagated by antiunion coal operators and featured heavily in the coal
commission report which, along with newspapers
reporting on the event, received national attention.
Much in the same way the Haymarket Affair in Chicago
created the misconception of anarchists as bomb
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dropped, and he was released from the state’s custody28.
Blizzard’s release was met with mixed responses from
the gathered crowd, with some lauding him a hero of
workers’ rights, while others felt justice had not been
served. Perhaps the most sobering comments from the
court’s proceedings that day came from Colonel C. W.
Osenton, principal counsel for the state in Blizzard’s

case. Osenton, referring to the first skirmish that began
the Battle of Blair Mountain, stated:
But your men did not give John Gore, [Logan
County Sheriff’s Deputy], Munsey or Cafalgo,
[both Blair locals working as part of Chafin’s
militia], a chance, when Munsey, dying with
a bullet through his neck, pleaded for mercy,
your men put a high-powered rifle to his head
and pulled the trigger on the ammunition you
probably gave him the night before, Bill. His
head bounded eight inches off the ground, and
then he died. I ask you, jurymen, to show Bill
more mercy than his army did those men or the
women and children of Logan valley.”29
Osenton’s comment here, in many ways, can
summarize the entire experience of Blizzard’s trial.
Blizzard himself was not present at this skirmish and
had no direct connection whatsoever to the deaths of
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throwers, the Battle of Blair Mountain was presented
as the inevitable outcome of any union activity. In this
sense, the Battle of Blair Mountain can be considered
a complete victory, both militarily and politically, for
the coal industry, but the impact of the battle did not
end there.
While the battle damaged the reputation of
unions as a whole for years, it also exposed the plight
of mine workers, and the terrible conditions they
worked under that motivated them to armed resistance
in the first place. As a result, a new wave of the labor
movement was established during the 1930s, starting
with more progressive labor laws under the New Deal
in 1933 and continuing with the founding of even
larger and more prominent unions such as the Steel
Workers, whose founding incorporated former UMWA
members. In this sense, the Battle of Blair Mountain,
while a loss for the UMWA in accomplishing their
short-term goals, was successful in their larger effort
of swaying federal support to their side, albeit long
after the conflict itself ended.
While understanding who the victor of the
battle was is fairly straightforward, responsibility for its
instigation is far more muddled. As is the case in most
conflicts, blame changes hands depending on which
event in time is considered the instigation point. If the
battle is only considered to have begun when the first
shots were fired, then the UMWA could be considered
responsible, as they made the conscious decision to
arm themselves and march on Logan County, with
the explicit intention of carrying out a jailbreak and
vigilante justice. Stepping back further, the BaldwinFelts Detective Agency could be considered the
instigators when they murdered Sid Hatfield, which
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prompted the UMWA to march in the first place.
Sheriff Chafin could be considered the escalator when
he allegedly shot union sympathizers and provoked
a reignition of the conflict after the UMWA had
already stood down. Bill Blizzard could be considered
responsible for his organization and command of the
UMWA’s armed forces and encouragement to return
to Blair after the UMWA had initially disbanded their
forces. President Harding and the federal government,
including the U.S. Army and National Guard, could
also be considered culpable for the Battle of Blair
Mountain, both for their lack of involvement in
resolving the conflict between the UMWA and coal
industry before it turned violent, as well as their
incitement of violence against the UMWA, especially
the suggestion of bombing the union, which doubtless
inspired and encouraged Chafin’s own bombing
campaign. As such, responsibility for the Battle of
Blair Mountain, and the loss of lives on both sides of
the engagement, cannot fall solely on a single person’s
or organization's shoulders and is instead shared by all
who were involved.
When considering the issue of responsibility
for the Battle of Blair Mountain, reflect once more
on Colonel Osenton’s remarks about Bill Blizzard
during his trial, “show Bill more mercy than his
army did those men or the women and children of
Logan valley.”30 Osenton had no sympathy towards
Blizzard’s cause and clearly believed that Blizzard and
the UMWA bore the responsibility of instigating the
battle, but, despite that fact, still felt that Blizzard did
not deserve the same fate as those killed by his forces.

This could point to Osenton’s capacity for mercy, but
more likely indicates the extremely complex issue of
ascribing blame to an event with a history as complex
as the Battle of Blair Mountain. Certain individuals
played instrumental roles in both the escalation and
perpetuation of the conflict as well as its aftermath, but
this does not change the fact that the Battle of Blair
Mountain was the product of numerous individual and
collective decisions carried out by a wide range of
parties, each with their own interests and motivations.
This created a tangled web of a conflict that it’s origin
points is a matter of perspective and opinion rather
than concrete fact.
Since its conclusion in 1921, the Battle of
Blair Mountain, while a national story at the time, has
been relegated to the fringes of labor history. Both
Blair Mountain, where the battle was fought, and the
Charles Town courthouse, where Blizzard along with
many other miners were tried, are both at risk of being
destroyed. The courthouse’s status on the National
Historic Register is up for debate, and Blair Mountain,
a formerly protected site, is slowly being demolished
as part of new coal mining operations. Blair and
Logan County have both vanished, being transformed
into union-incorporated territory and absorbed into
other communities, along with dozens of other towns
and counties in West Virginia that have experienced
massive economic decline over the past hundred
years. Tragically, erasure of the history of the Battle
of Blair Mountain is being spurred on by the locations
and communities involved in the event. This summer
marks the hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Blair

“’Disgrace to State,’ Some Yell, But Great Mass Cheer Verdict. Never Had Intention to Commit Treason, Blizzard Says.” Charleston
Gazette, May 28th, 1922.
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Mountain, and its passing should serve as a reminder
that continued study, discussion, and awareness of the
West Virginia Mine Wars, the most critical conflict
in U.S. labor history, are needed now more than ever
to help preserve these historical sites before they are
relegated entirely to the past. The inspiration and goal
of this piece was to call new audiences’ attention to
this fascinating chapter in American history and ideally
inspire further research of the study, so that its legacy
and history can continue to be explored and shared with
future generations of scholars and students of history.
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